Most wars will either be far less lethal or far more lethal than the median. The bottom 50 percent of wars have an average of about 2,900 battle deaths, while the top 50 percent have an average of 653,000, and it is effectively a coin-flip which half any given war will end up in. In Ukraine, after three months and with no end in sight, Western analysts estimate at least 20,000 fatalities, putting this war well into the top half of conflicts.

One might argue that the statistical evidence tells us little about any given war, and we might have a much better idea as to the escalation risks in a given conflict than it might appear by looking at the entire dataset. No one thought the Falkland Islands War was going to engulf all of Europe. Skeptical American analysts were more concerned with the political ramifications for Margaret Thatcher should the counter-invasion fail and spent little, if any, time considering broader military implications. But did they know, or did they simply assume?

The Bush administration assumed that the Iraq War would be quick and produce few casualties. The Biden administration assumed the Afghan government could make the Taliban fight for every mile instead of collapsing before U.S. forces even finished pulling out. Saddam Hussein was convinced the United States would not intervene in his invasion of Kuwait. Kaiser Wilhelm II is often quoted as having said, in August 1914, that his soldiers “would be home before the leaves fall from the trees.” Russia thought its invasion of Ukraine would be a simple operation against a much weaker foe. It should be no surprise that the outcome of a war is hard to predict even in the most lopsided of circumstances: Consider how many wars have been lost by the aggressor!

What does all this tell us about the war in Ukraine? ...Not even four months in, we are already well into the upper 50 percent of that category (median of casualties). Where do we expect it to stop? Many analysts thought the war was unlikely to begin with. Once it began, the common wisdom was that Ukraine could not possibly hold off Russia for long. But the war is still ongoing and casualties continue to mount. In the deadlier half of wars, 10 percent have over a million battle deaths — what is stopping the Ukraine conflict from reaching that number?

If there is a redline we should prioritize, it is not the 2021 or 2013 borders of Ukraine but its survival as a sovereign state, free of dictation from Moscow, with direct trade links to the outside world, and capable of defending itself against future aggression. While restoring the pre-invasion borders is desirable as a war aim, it is not essential. Ukraine’s continued sovereignty is. Its continuance would mark a defeat for Putin’s maximal war aims and a warning against future Russian revanchist adventures.

Johnson made a Cossack as thanks for backing Ukraine