Persecution of the political opposition in Moldova

Question: Moldova continues harassing representatives of its political opposition. On August 29 this week, the Chisinau Chamber of Appeals upheld a court decision on the house arrest of former President of Moldova Igor Dodon until September 21. Last week, the same court rejected a plea to release Marina Tauber, vice-chair of the opposition Shor Party, from detention. On August 18 of this year, a Moldovan task force conducted exercises in the capital of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia. Local commentators portrayed this as an act of intimidation by Chisinau, which demonstrated its resolve to crack down on manifestations of protest. What do you think about the mounting authoritarian actions of the Moldovan authorities that declare their commitment to European and democratic values?

Maria Zakharova: We are closely following the domestic developments in Moldova, including the procedural actions against the opposition leaders you mentioned. There is no doubt that this is the internal affair of the republic. However, the law-enforcement bodies of that country are focusing only on the politicians that advocate constructive relations with the Russian Federation. This fact points to the political character of this harassment.

The attempts of the current Moldovan leaders to get rid of their opponents by any means can hardly enhance their prestige. Judging by what we see, the people of Moldova are developing a strong allergy to such unseemly methods of political struggle. This is clear from the numerous protests and rallies in support of the above leaders, which regularly take place in the country.

Unfortunately, instead of listening to their citizens, conducting a broad public dialogue, and jointly searching for solutions, the current Moldovan authorities ostracise those who are against the ongoing processes in the country.

We would like to see a critical assessment of Chisinau’s actions by the related international agencies (including the OSCE and the Council of Europe). Chisinau received EU member candidate status in June of this year, and we would like to know to what extent its methods of clearing the political and media landscapes match the high standards of democracy, media freedom and human rights. I haven’t seen any assessments like this yet, but I’m sure they will appear.

As of the late 1990s the command system and communications networks support nuclear operations, including launch on warning, were typically five or more years past due for overhaul and modernization, with some components ten or more years past their design life.
The nuclear suitcases that receive early warning information and accompany the President, Defense Minister, and Chief of the General Staff, were falling into disrepair.
Periodically the central command system would go into a "loss of regime" mode, which is a neutral position where it could not send out commands.